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the Bibliothèque Nationale—and the account of the historical activities of the Jesuits and the Benedictines of St. Maur (pp. 161–171).

M. Lavissee finds his true field once more in a return to politics and diplomacy in book VIII. He leads off with one of those striking expressions in which he is so felicitous—"La Guerre était une habitude dans la civilisation d'alors" (p. 222)—then follows with vivid narrative chapters upon the Hapsburgs, Germany and Italy, the traditional allies of France, England and Holland, the "orientation" of French politics, admirable summaries of the condition of the army and the navy—all preliminary to two splendid chapters on the War of Devolution and the greater War with Holland. The author protests against the familiar belief that Louis XIV. was consumed with ideas of grandeur and glory; he shows the bearing upon the king's policy of the idea of "natural frontiers", already an old tradition of France, which guided the policy of her kings for more centuries than many are wont to believe. (In this connection M. Lavissee might have referred his readers to the late Albert Sorel's admirable sketch of the genesis and development of the idea of France's natural frontiers in *La Révolution Française*, I. 254 ff.)

The thoroughness of research comes out in the account of Turenne's brilliant campaign. The usual belief represented by Clausewitz, but primarily due to Napoleon who had in mind the later policy of Prussia, is that the Great Elector did not seriously desire the recovery of Alsace. M. Lavissee, on the evidence of contemporary *mémoires* and Turenne's letters, has avoided the pitfall into which several historians of the wars of Louis XIV. have fallen.

The bibliographies appended to each book, as has been the case throughout the series, are excellent. I note but one important omission, the interesting *Savile Correspondence* (Camden Society, 1858), which casts a most valuable light upon the condition of the Huguenots immediately before the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.

JAMES WESTFALL THOMPSON.

Marshal Turenne. By the author of "A Life of Sir Kenelm Digby". With an Introduction by Brigadier-General FRANCIS LLOYD, C.B., D.S.O. (London and New York: Longmans, Green and Company. 1907. Pp. xxiii, 401.)

AFTER a thousand years of, for the most part, unintelligent warfare, there arose, in the seventeenth century, three sets of great generals, who re-established war on the methodical basis that had not been known since the decline of Rome. These groups centred about Gustavus Adolphus, about Condé and Turenne, and about Marlborough and Eugene. Turenne worked with and learned from the lieutenants Gustavus had trained; and in his turn he was, as Wolseley says, Marlborough's "tutor in war". Again, Frederick was influenced by Marlborough's battles; and thus, for a hundred years, intellectual growth in

war harked back to the great Swede. Of Gustavus's followers Turenne was one of the greatest, and no better study exists for soldiers than that of his campaigns. The volume before us is a biography of the man Turenne, and a picture of the partly trivial, partly gigantic, events of the day, when either the land-hunger of a monarch or the smile of a frail court beauty might set an army in motion. The great deeds in war of this pattern of soldiers occupy less space than the politico-social doings of the rulers, their ministers and their courtiers; but the intricate conflict of religions and the never-ceasing wars of the Louis are a part of the life of every prominent character in that restless century.

Turenne was a man of war from his youth—a captain at fifteen, a colonel at nineteen, a *maréchal de camp* (major-general) at twenty-three. A grandson of William the Silent, he came honestly by his sturdy ability, and though, up to twelve, he was “weak” “stupid and lazy”, he yet seems to have learned to ride and fence and speak the truth. He lacked good looks, except such as every truly great man possesses; but he exhibited quality in all his acts. In his early years of command he led small armies; later, in Flanders, large ones, and he handled each with expertness. Greater in strategy than as a battle captain, he did not win because he had weak opponents, for he fought against the great Condé, and measured wits with that master of deception, Montecuculi; and though no man ever boasted a more upright character than Turenne, he was a very Hannibal for strategem—for cheating the enemy. He was endowed with nearly all the military virtues. With equal courage and discretion, he attacked the enemy only when a definite gain could be accomplished; but his onset was vigorous, he inspired his troops as few have done, and led them with intrepidity. On the road, he made his men march far and fast for those days—100 miles in four days on one occasion—and he shared their trials then as well as when they went hungry in camp. He was their “father”. All told, few leaders have conducted campaigns as full of easily-learned lessons for the soldier of today.

All this our author brings out in a pleasant style; and he illustrates his meaning with many stories about his hero's good qualities—in this case there were really few weaknesses to mar the picture; but, as in every biography, the hero looms up beyond the proper perspective. Intertwined with the story of Turenne are notes on the many court scandals and intrigues of the day, the favors given or denied by those in power, and many historical facts striving to show that Turenne, more than most other leaders, was hampered by opposition or hatred at the source of command and supply; and indeed a general is better off to be denied a command than to be given one and then to be starved in men or means. Failure is wont to be ascribed to the latter cause; but Turenne never made excuses for his own failures. “He manoeuvred better than I did” sufficed.

The author leans heavily on Ramsay, and quotes largely from

Napoleon's *Abstract of the Wars of Marshal Turenne*. He mentions his authorities in the text, as he quotes them, with few foot-notes. There is a short index, and one two-page map of Europe, covering rather insufficiently the theatre before us. Interspersed in the book are a number of battle-plans from Ramsay, which, like all old charts, give but an indefinite conception of their conduct. The topography is in most cases quite imaginary, the artist never having seen the ground, and there being few accessible minute maps, as in these days of Great General Staffs; and upon such topography is depicted the battle order of the troops, as on parade. Such maps are interesting rather than illuminative. The volume is pleasant to the reader on account of its excellent make-up, illustrations, type and paper.

The introduction by General Francis Lloyd is suggestive but in some points challenges disagreement. Napoleon's passage of the Alps, *e. g.*, was a mere clever incident in a fine plan of campaign, which can in no sense be compared with Hannibal's: only Alexander's crossing of the Hindu-Kush can be. Armies frequently crossed the Alps in the Revolutionary days, even in winter. Science had created roads for Napoleon, or even for Turenne: there was scarcely more than a barbarian's foot, or pack-horse path in Hannibal's day. Nor did Hannibal know the topography, or even the geography, of the range, or of either side of the Alps. Polybius clearly shows this. Again, while it is true that Turenne was great as a strategist, it can scarcely be maintained that those "strategical marches which began in 1647... formed a new development in the art of war". We must not forget the strategical insight of Gustavus Adolphus, and his amazing accomplishment from June, 1630, to November, 1632, in which period he reconquered nearly all Germany from the Empire—and against such leaders as Tilly and Wallenstein. This was the first, and it remains the finest strategical performance from the days of Caesar to those of Napoleon.

The Cambridge Modern History. Planned by the late Lord ACTON, LL.D. Edited by A. W. WARD, Litt.D., G. W. PROTHERO, Litt.D., STANLEY LEATHES, M.A. Volume V. *The Age of Louis XIV.* (Cambridge: University Press; New York: The Macmillan Company. 1908. Pp. xxxii, 971.)

WITH the appearance of the present volume the *Cambridge Modern History* shows evidence of reaching proportions which would have given pause even to that champion of "a good body of history", Sir Walter Raleigh himself. As it nears completion the full magnitude of the work begins to be fully revealed. Compared with like recent undertakings in French and German it becomes almost colossal. Though it covers a far smaller field than Lavissee and Rambaud, it already bulks as large, and compared with Helmolt the contrast is even greater. In view of this, one is tempted to wonder what its ultimate destination and value will be. That it is a success, financially, we are assured, and the